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At a recent special panel on the Georgian crisis convened at the Bled Strategic Forum, European foreign
ministers and representatives of international organizations lamented that they had failed to adequately
engage Georgia's unresolved or "frozen conflicts." Since the early 1990s, the international community
effectively ignored the disputes between Tbilisi and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, allowing tensions to
fester until in early August the disputes escalated into a six-day war between Georgia and Russia. Russia's
subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence has legally challenged Georgia's
very territorial integrity and sovereign boundaries.
While much of the West struggles to enforce a precarious ceasefire and formulate a common response to
Russia's actions, it is worth considering the exact sovereign forms that might govern Georgia in the near
future. Three options - indefinite occupation, formal partition or international administration - are possible;
though all three pose risks, the internationalization option, the least discussed thus far, may offer the best
blueprint for stabilizing the region and eventually resolving status issues.
Under the first and most likely scenario, Abkhazia and South Ossetia will remain recognized by Russia and
a handful of other countries, such as Nicaragua, that wish to curry favor with Moscow. We could refer to
this as the "Cyprus model." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive [4]]. Under this arrangement,
Russia ensures the dependency of the breakaway territories by stationing a permanent military contingent
and keeping the de facto governments isolated from Georgia. In the case of Cyprus, the Turkish military
intervention of 1974 was followed by a relatively stable three decades, during which a sizable contingent of
Turkish troops was stationed in the self-proclaimed Turkish Northern Republic of Cyprus (TRNC). During
this time the sequestered TRNC languished, while the Greek-Cypriot part of the island developed rapidly,
culminating in its admission to the European Union 30 years later. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive [5]].
The Cyprus model is less likely to stabilize Georgia. Unlike Cyprus or Northern Ireland, Georgia and the
breakaway territories have no realistic hope of being absorbed by the European Union. Tbilisi has made
restoring Georgia's territorial integrity politically paramount and, even after its military defeat, is already
being supported anew by inflows of US economic and military assistance. [For background see the
Eurasia Insight archive [6]]. The risk of a renewed military clash between Georgia and the breakaway
territories will loom large as long as the United States and Russia actively supports each side.
Perpetual unrecognized status also would have destructive economic consequences. Unable to forge
"normal" economic ties with the world due to an international embargo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia would
be forced to depend exclusively on Russian aid packages and fiscal transfers. Without official aid from
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international economic institutions, the de facto authorities and their security services would be forced to
operate within the illicit economy and would exploit their unregulated legal status to engage in smuggling,
trafficking and money laundering.
A second, though less likely sovereign possibility, is that Georgia itself will be formally partitioned. Under
what some have advocated as a "grand compromise" between Russia and the West, a pro-Western
Georgia would be admitted to NATO, but its territory would be curtailed as the breakaway territories would
be severed and either formally annexed to the Russian Federation (more likely in the Ossetian case) or
recognized internationally as independent.
Although, such an arrangement could "normalize" the status and behavior of the territories, partition would
set an unacceptably dangerous international precedent, one considerably more destabilizing than the so-
called "Kosovo precedent." Regional powers would retain the right to intervene militarily in neighboring
states under a type of ethnically based justification that the international community explicitly rejected
during the Balkan Wars. A legally partitioned Georgia would also dramatically heighten the insecurity of
other post-Soviet territories with large numbers ethnic Russians, especially Ukraine, Moldova and
Kazakhstan.
A third option would be to internationalize the status of the breakaway territories altogether and place them
under international trusteeship and administration. With authorization from the United Nations, the
international community - as it did in the post conflict settings of Bosnia and Kosovo - could assume
supervision of the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. An international peacekeeping force would
guarantee security, one that would include a sizable contingent of Russian peacekeepers, but who would
be placed under an international command structure. International peacekeepers could be supplemented
by an external civilian police force that would coordinate with the activities of the de facto security services
under OSCE auspices.
As they did in East Timor and Kosovo, UN civilian advisors would work with de facto authorities and their
respective ministries to bring administrative capacity and practices up to international democratic
standards. An international body could monitor the orderly return of internally displaced persons to certain
areas and begin a process of property claims and restitution. The move to final status negotiations would
be deferred until international monitors were satisfied that governance had been brought in line with
international standards.
International administration would also economically connect for the first time the breakaway territories to
the international economy and its institutions. Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be offered valuable trade
deals and would become eligible for reconstruction funds from the European Union, emergency financing
from the International Monetary Fund and development aid from the World Bank. Increased economic ties
with Georgia would help forge links and business interests between the communities.
Though not the current first choice option of any of the regional parties involved, an internationalization
strategy could yield benefits for all sides. The international community would have a common focal point to
channel its engagement and resources, while the de facto governments of the breakaway territories would
be offered a chance to finally engage with the international community as if they were independent. The
government of Georgia would buy itself a number of years to rebuild trust with authorities in Abkhazia
and/or South Ossetia before status would be decided. Finally, the Russian Federation, by conceding the
territories to international authority, could demonstrate its willingness to play an engaged and constructive
role in an internationally sanctioned legal process to stabilize the region. An international presence that
guaranteed order and stability would transform the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi,
just miles from the Abkhaz border, from a tense and volatile political dispute, to a pre-Olympic period that
showcased Russia's pivotal role in facilitating renewed international engagement with the Caucasus.
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Editor's note:  Alexander Cooley is Associate Professor of Political Science at Barnard College,
Columbia University. He is the co-author (with Hendrik Spruyt) of the forthcoming Contracting States:
Sovereign Transfers in International Politics, to be published by Princeton University Press in 2009.
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